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Platform Economy as an Important Organizational Form in the Digital Economy Era: A Game Theory Perspective on Dynamic Competition Strategies in Multisided Markets

Author(s)

Letian Xia

Affiliation(s)

Institute of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, Jiangxi, China *Corresponding Author

Abstract

The platform economy, as a significant organizational form in the digital economy era, exhibits unique characteristics of multisided markets that render traditional competition theories for one-sided markets inadequate. This paper systematically reviews theoretical models and empirical research on dynamic competition strategies in multisided markets from a game theory perspective, and analyzes the long-term equilibrium path of platform competition using evolutionary game theory. The study finds that the core of platform competition lies in the dynamic coordination of cross-side network effects and the positive feedback mechanism of user scale, and that strategic choices need to balance short-term gains with long-term ecological evolution. Future research needs to further integrate dynamic game theory with complex systems theory to address the new challenges of data-driven platform economies.

Keywords

Multisided Markets; Game Theory; Dynamic Competition Strategies; Evolutionary Equilibrium; Cross-Side Network Effects

References

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