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The Adjustment of the U.S. Cybersecurity Competition Strategy Against China in Trump's Second Term

Author(s)

Yixuan Li, Yixuan Zhao, Haiyan Wang

Affiliation(s)

Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

Abstract

The U.S.-China cybersecurity competition entered a new phase of institutional competition during the Trump 2.0 era. In his second term, Trump reshaped U.S. cyber policies with sovereignty as a priority, leading to a three-pronged confrontation between China and the U.S. in economic development, technological blockade, and diplomatic governance. U.S. economic sanctions shifted from tariffs to financial disconnection, while technological blockades expanded from hardware to knowledge networks. Diplomatic pressure leveraged multilateral platforms to solidify anti-China standards. China concentrated on chip and operating system development through national laboratories, established cross-border alert mechanisms via ASEAN and BRICS, and elevated legal status to block long-arm jurisdiction. Limited cooperation potential exists between the two sides in ransomware monitoring, data classification flows, and IoT standard-setting, with political trust deficits and technological differences constituting major obstacles. Third-party experimental environments and voluntary norms have become practical channels to reduce compliance risks.

Keywords

Cybersecurity; Sino-US Rivalry; Digital Sovereignty; Strategic Competition; Trump 2.0

References

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