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Resource-Incentive Interactions in Rural Governance Efficiency: Evidence from China​

Author(s)

Li Zhaoshan

Affiliation(s)

FuDan University, Shanghai, China

Abstract

This study examines how project-based resources and grassroots administrative incentives independently and interactively impact rural governance efficiency in China. Grounded in transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory, we propose an integrated framework where resources reduce implementation costs while incentives align local officials’actions with policy goals. Empirical analysis of 200 stakeholder surveys from four villages in rural China confirms significant positive effects: resources and incentives independently enhance efficiency. Crucially, their interaction amplifies this effect, demonstrating synergy. Findings underscore that optimizing China’s rural revitalization requires simultaneous strengthening of resource allocation systems and performance-linked incentive structures to mitigate transaction costs and agency problems.

Keywords

Rural Governance Efficiency; Project-Based Resources; Grassroots Administrative Incentives; Interaction Effects

References

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