

Collective Action Dilemma Resolution and Grassroots Governance Efficiency Improvement: Practical Mechanism of Red Property Management - a Case Study of Yushan Subdistrict, Pingyin, Jinan

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Abstract: Old residential communities are typical common-pool resources, which easily produce free-riding behaviors and persistent collective action dilemmas. Existing domestic studies on red property management mostly focus on hardware transformation results and macro model construction, while neglecting the hierarchical distinction between hardware and software governance contradictions, as well as multi-stakeholder interest game logic. Few literatures systematically explain the realistic paradox that "old community hardware renovation is easy, yet long-term stable co-governance is difficult". Taking Yushan Subdistrict of Pingyin County, Jinan as the research case, this paper adopts three classic theories including collective action theory, social capital theory and common-pool resource self-governance theory to sort out the complete governance evolution track of local old residential communities. The research finds that aging public facilities are only superficial governance barriers; the fundamental reason for blocked collective action lies in the triple deficiency of community trust, standardized coordination rules and cross-subject linkage networks. Relying Party-building platforms to revitalize community social capital, the local property fee collection rate increased from 30% to 90%. On the basis of case mechanism analysis, this paper puts forward targeted long-term optimization strategies from two dimensions of deep social capital cultivation and resident autonomous empowerment, which can provide operable practical references for the co-governance construction of old residential communities across the country.

Keywords: Old Residential Communities; Red Property Management; Collective Action

Conflicts; Multi-Stakeholder Co-Governance

1. Introduction

1.1 Research Background

With the comprehensive advancement of national urban renewal work, the governance orientation of urban old residential communities has undergone a profound shift. The past single focus on large-scale hardware reconstruction has gradually turned to refined, long-term and multi-subject collaborative grassroots governance. Most old residential communities in county towns evolved from various work-unit dormitories built in the 1980s and 1990s. These communities generally suffer from low construction standards, aging public supporting facilities, complex property right relations, scattered resident groups and fractured long-term governance systems. After the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and the large-scale withdrawal of market-oriented property enterprises, a large number of old communities fell into a special governance vacuum with no professional operation team, unified management rules and sustainable maintenance funds.

From the perspective of public governance theory, the public corridors, fire-fighting equipment, green belts and shared parking spaces inside old communities all belong to typical common-pool resources. Such resources cannot realize exclusive use for single individuals. All residents can share public benefits, but maintenance costs and daily governance responsibilities are hard to accurately allocate among residents. Without effective institutional binding and multi-party coordination mechanisms, residents' individual rational choices will override collective public interests, and widespread free-riding, passive

waiting and resistance to property fees will emerge, eventually triggering the classic tragedy of the commons in grassroots community governance.

Current academic research concerning red property management has obvious structural limitations. Most scholars focus on summarizing the construction models and hardware renovation achievements of red property, and interpret its macro governance advantages under the leadership of Party building. However, few studies conduct micro analysis on the interest games between subdistricts, communities, property enterprises and residents. Meanwhile, existing literature fails to clearly distinguish superficial hardware contradictions and deep-seated software coordination contradictions, so it cannot reasonably explain the universal realistic problem that communities still face frequent conflicts after introducing property services.

Yushan Subdistrict of Pingyin County governs 66 old work-unit residential areas, covering enterprises, government organs and public institution dormitories, which is a highly representative research sample of county-level old community governance. Before the full coverage of red property services, the subdistrict faced prominent hardware problems such as damaged roads, blocked sewage pipes and missing fire extinguishers. Hidden dangers including random overhead wires and piled corridor debris appeared repeatedly. Resident groups are mainly laid-off workers and elderly residents with limited income, whose public participation awareness is relatively weak. At that time, the property fee collection rate of the whole subdistrict was less than 30%, and the number of appeals on the 12345 government service hotline remained at the top of the county all year round, forming a vicious cycle of poor living environment-low payment rate-deteriorated service quality.

To break this governance deadlock, Yushan Subdistrict took the provincial Qilu Red Property policy as guidance and established a wholly state-owned public welfare red property service enterprise to realize full coverage of old community property services. In the early stage of operation, the enterprise invested a great deal of manpower and material resources to complete centralized hardware renovation and hidden danger elimination, and residents' living environment was significantly improved. However, the short-term hardware rectification

only covered up the deep-seated software contradictions. After the completion of renovation, the collective action conflicts hidden for a long time broke out intensively. The misalignment of power and responsibility between subdistrict administration and resident autonomy, disjointed connection between communities and property, as well as the opposition between residents' personalized demands and the public welfare positioning of red property jointly hindered the implementation of governance work.

Abandoning the short-sighted governance logic of only emphasizing renovation rather than institutional construction, Yushan Subdistrict took Party building as the core starting point, reconstructed cross-subject governance networks, repaired broken community trust, standardized co-governance systems and continuously empowered residents' autonomous capacity. A series of institutional innovations gradually resolved the multi-subject game deadlock, and realized the fundamental transformation of community governance from disorder and frequent conflicts to standardized long-term co-governance, forming a typical practical case worthy of reference for solving collective action dilemmas in old residential communities.

1.2 Research Questions

Based on the three-stage complete governance evolution track of Yushan Subdistrict's old communities - governance vacuum disorder → hardware improvement by red property → outbreak of software collective action conflicts → institutional restructuring → stable long-term co-governance, this paper puts forward three core research questions to be solved. First, what differentiated collective action conflicts exist among the four stakeholders of subdistricts, communities, red property enterprises and residents? How to define and distinguish the essential differences and internal logical relations between superficial hardware contradictions and deep-seated software coordination contradictions? Second, guided by collective action theory, social capital theory and common-pool resource self-governance theory, how to systematically interpret the generation logic and solidification causes of multi-stakeholder collective action conflicts in old communities? Third, what are the uniqueness and typicality of Yushan Subdistrict's red

property governance model? What practical mechanisms does it adopt to resolve multi-subject interest games and break collective action dilemmas, and how to optimize supporting systems to avoid the repeated outbreak of governance conflicts in the long run?

1.3 Research Significance

1.3.1 Theoretical Significance

Most existing studies on red property management adopt single collaborative governance theory for macro analysis, lacking integrated application of multiple classic grassroots governance theories and micro research on stakeholder game behaviors. This paper innovatively integrates collective action, social capital and common-pool resource self-governance theories, and constructs a closed-loop research framework covering contradiction classification, mechanism deduction, case practice and long-term optimization. The paper clearly separates hardware supply-demand contradictions and software coordination contradictions, and incorporates trust fracture, missing norms and fragmented governance networks into theoretical analysis. It effectively makes up for the research defects of existing literatures that attach too much importance to hardware achievements and macro frameworks while ignoring micro subject games, enriches the application scenarios of grassroots collective governance theories, and provides a new analytical perspective for subsequent research on old residential community governance.

1.3.2 Practical Significance

Old residential communities across the country generally face the realistic dilemma that it is easy to introduce property services but difficult to realize sustained co-governance. The core root of this problem lies in disordered multi-subject interest games rather than aging public facilities. Taking Yushan Subdistrict as a typical county-level case, this paper sorts out four types of core game conflicts between governance subjects, and summarizes replicable practical experience of red property in activating community collective action. The research conclusions can effectively respond to common governance pain points such as vague power boundaries and resident distrust in county old communities, and promote the transformation of old community governance from phased hardware rectification to institutionalized long-term operation, which is of great practical value for advancing the

modernization of urban grassroots governance systems and governance capacity.

2. Theoretical Foundation and Overall Analytical Framework

2.1 Three Core Theoretical Bases

2.1.1 Collective Action Theory

Olson's collective action theory reveals the inherent logical contradiction between individual rationality and collective rationality in public affairs governance. In the governance scenario of public goods and shared resources, rational individuals will prioritize maximizing personal interests and evading public maintenance costs, leading to widespread free-riding and collective irrational results. The theory also points out that the larger the group scale, the more scattered individual benefits, and the more ambiguous the responsibility division, the harder it is to form effective collective action.

The governance of old residential communities is a typical collective action scenario. The four stakeholders of Yushan Subdistrict hold completely differentiated interest demands: subdistricts focus on maintaining grassroots governance order and reducing petition risks; communities hope to reduce daily work pressure; red property enterprises need to balance public welfare service tasks and basic operating costs; residents expect low-cost and all-round community services. Without unified collective governance consensus, each subject only pursues its own optimal interest results, resulting in fragmented governance behaviors and continuous community conflicts, which forms the core logical source of all kinds collective action dilemmas in local old communities.

2.1.2 Social Capital Theory

Social capital mainly includes three interrelated core dimensions: trust, standardized norms and social networks, which constitute the endogenous core resources for realizing multi-stakeholder cooperation and orderly collective action. Trust can reduce communication costs and ease inter-subject confrontations; norms clarify responsibility boundaries and restrain individual irrational behaviors; networks integrate scattered governance subjects and smooth the transmission channels of residents' demands. The three dimensions are interdependent and indispensable to guarantee effective grassroots co-governance.

The long-term governance disorder of Yushan

Subdistrict's old communities fundamentally stems from the comprehensive scarcity of three-dimensional social capital. Long-term management vacuum destroyed the two-way trust between residents and grassroots governance departments; the absence of unified co-governance norms normalized buck-passing and free-riding behaviors; fragmented communication channels isolated subdistricts, communities and residents from each other. Hardware aging is only a superficial phenomenon, while the triple deficiency of social capital is the fundamental bottleneck restricting the realization of long-term stable co-governance.

2.1.3 Common-Pool Resource Self-Governance Theory

Ostrom's common-pool resource self-governance theory breaks the binary opposition thinking of government control or full marketization for public resources, and puts forward the community autonomous governance path. The theory holds that for non-exclusive shared public resources, localized institutional systems, multi-participation mechanisms and matching supervision rules can be constructed to restrain free-riding behaviors and realize sustainable operation of community public facilities.

The public resources inside old communities fully conform to the research scene of common-pool resources. In the early governance stage of Yushan Subdistrict, all governance work relied solely on administrative external promotion, without complete resident participation, decision-making and supervision channels. The blank of endogenous autonomous governance system made it impossible to balance the differentiated interests of all parties and restrict residents' irrational behaviors of occupying public space and evading property fees. The institutional innovation of local red property is essentially to build a resident-centered self-governance system through comprehensive institutional reconstruction and mass empowerment.

2.2 Closed-Loop Research Analytical Framework

Combined with the three core theories above, this paper constructs a complete closed-loop research logic framework:

First, sort out the three progressive evolution stages of governance conflicts in Yushan Subdistrict, and divide all contradictions into

superficial hardware conflicts and deep-seated software collective action conflicts to clarify the core research objects of this paper;

Second, analyze the formation mechanism of multi-stakeholder collective action conflicts from three dimensions of differentiated individual rationality, three-dimensional social capital scarcity and blank autonomous governance system;

Third, systematically interpret the core practical mechanisms and tangible governance effects of Yushan's red property model to resolve stakeholder games and activate community collective action;

Finally, identify the deep-seated structural deficiencies existing in current governance from a theoretical perspective, and put forward targeted long-term optimization paths adapted to the actual situation of old residential community co-governance.

3. Evolution and Classification of Governance Conflicts in Yushan Subdistrict's Old Communities

3.1 Three Progressive Stages of Governance and Conflict Evolution

Stage 1: Governance Vacuum Dominated by Hardware Conflicts

Before the introduction of red property services, Yushan Subdistrict's old communities experienced dual governance fractures caused by the exit of work-unit management and mass withdrawal of market-oriented property companies, falling into a long-term management vacuum without professional maintenance subjects and unified rules. All prominent governance conflicts in this stage concentrated on physical hardware problems, including damaged roads, blocked pipe networks, aging septic tanks and missing fire-fighting facilities. Hidden dangers such as random wire laying and stacked debris appeared frequently, bringing potential risks to residents' personal and property safety. Without special maintenance funds and teams, public resources were continuously damaged, residents' satisfaction remained at a low level, and government complaint volume stayed high all year round.

The conflicts in this stage are single physical contradictions without complex multi-subject game relations. Such problems can be quickly eliminated through government financial investment and centralized renovation. However,

hardware rectification only improves residents' short-term living experience, and cannot fundamentally resolve the long-term collective action dilemmas inside communities.

Stage 2: Initial Operation of Red Property, Comprehensive Outbreak of Software Conflicts
Since 2021, Yushan Subdistrict realized full coverage of red property services. With large-scale investment in centralized renovation, all hardware hidden dangers in the community were eliminated in a short time, residents' living conditions were greatly improved. But the solution of superficial hardware problems triggered the comprehensive outbreak of hidden software collective action conflicts. Vague power and responsibility boundaries, mismatched interest demands and broken trust relations led to continuous game frictions among four stakeholders. The subdistrict believed that property implementation was not in place; communities faced heavy resident mobilization pressure; red property bore high labor costs with low payment rates; residents resisted paying fees and denied service effects. All subjects waited and restricted each other, forming a new governance deadlock of failed collective action and fluctuating governance effects.

Stage 3: In-Depth Institutional Reconstruction and Realization of Long-Term Co-Governance
Aiming at the deep-seated software conflicts exposed after hardware renovation, Yushan Subdistrict abandoned the single hardware renovation thinking and took Party building as the core to reconstruct cross-subject governance networks, repair broken trust capital and improve co-governance institutional norms. A series of targeted institutional innovations unified the collective governance consensus of all parties and standardized daily coordination order. The four stakeholders transformed from mutual confrontation to linked joint governance, and the institutional reconstruction fundamentally broke the collective action deadlock, realizing the leap of community governance from disorderly conflict to standardized long-term stability.

3.2 Two Categories of Governance Conflicts

3.2.1 Superficial Hardware Supply-Demand Conflicts

Hardware contradictions refer to the mismatch between public infrastructure supply and residents' living demands, mainly including aging pipelines, damaged roads, insufficient

greening and various safety hidden dangers. Such conflicts are caused by long-term lack of maintenance funds and professional operation teams, with simple logical relations and single conflicting subjects. Centralized government investment can eliminate such problems quickly, which belong to the basic phased work of old community governance, but cannot provide institutional guarantee for long-term stable community operation.

3.2.2 Deep-Seated Software Collective Action Coordination Conflicts

Software contradictions are implicit institutional and trust conflicts among four governance subjects, which are the core bottleneck restricting long-term old community governance, and can be divided into four typical game conflicts:

1.Game conflicts between subdistricts and red property: Subdistricts take public welfare governance and safety stability as core goals, while state-owned red property needs to balance public service tasks and daily operating costs. Differences in governance standards and cost-bearing modes lead to target misalignment and perfunctory implementation of some governance tasks.

2.Coordination disconnection conflicts between communities and red property: Communities are responsible for collecting residents' demands and mobilizing residents to participate in public affairs; property enterprises undertake daily facility maintenance and on-site services. The lack of normalized linkage mechanisms leads to information isolation and mutual buck-passing between the two sides.

3.Supply-demand trust conflicts between red property and residents: Residents expect low-cost comprehensive services, and hold deep prejudice against property services due to the bad experience of previous market-oriented property companies. Red property can only provide standardized basic services with narrow profit space, forming long-term trust fracture and widespread resistance to property fees.

4.Resident collective participation conflicts: Residents have prominent individual rationality and universal free-riding psychology, eager to enjoy community public resources but refuse to bear maintenance costs. Most residents avoid participating in community deliberation and supervision, forming the unbalanced pattern that a small number of residents bear all governance costs while most residents free ride.

4. Generation Mechanism of Multi-Stakeholder Collective Action Conflicts

4.1 Differentiated Individual Rationality Triggers Failed Collective Coordination

The root of all collective action conflicts lies in the separation between individual rationality and collective rationality of four governance subjects. Each stakeholder has exclusive interest goals without unified community collective governance consensus. Subdistricts focus on risk control; communities intend to reduce daily workload; red property pursues operational balance; residents strive to minimize personal expenditure.

When all subjects only choose individual optimal strategies, there will be no active participants in public facility maintenance and community public affairs promotion, forming a stable game deadlock. Even after complete hardware renovation, the differentiated interest logic of all parties still hinders the formation of unified collective action, resulting in repeated and persistent community governance conflicts.

4.2 Three-Dimensional Scarcity of Social Capital Solidifies Governance Deadlock

First, trust capital is fully fractured. Long-term disorder and dishonest market property services formed deep resident prejudice against grassroots organizations, and loose neighborhood connections weakened mutual trust among residents. Trust deficiency greatly increases communication costs and intensifies inter-subject confrontations. Second, unified co-governance norms are missing. In the early governance stage, there were no clear power lists, joint work processes and reward-punishment systems. Positive co-governance behaviors lack material incentives, while free-riding and destructive acts have no rigid constraints, forming the phenomenon of bad money driving out good money.

Third, integrated governance networks are fragmented. Four stakeholders lack fixed communication platforms and information sharing channels. Governance instructions cannot be transmitted smoothly, and residents' demands cannot be fed back timely, making it impossible to integrate scattered subjects into a unified governance force.

4.3 Blank Autonomous Governance System

Makes Conflicts Hard to Eliminate

According to Ostrom's self-governance theory, sustainable operation of public resources requires mature resident autonomous systems. In the early governance stage of Yushan Subdistrict, all work relied on single administrative intervention, without resident independent decision-making, supervision and participation rights. There were supporting deficiencies in cost-sharing and violation restraint rules, which cannot effectively restrict residents' free-riding behaviors and balance differentiated multi-subject interests. Simple external administrative forces can only solve superficial hardware problems, but cannot reconcile deep-seated interest games, leading to repeated outbreaks of collective action conflicts.

5. Practical Mechanisms of Red Property to Break Collective Action Dilemmas

Different from the simple hardware renovation model adopted in most regions, Yushan's red property model focuses on solving software-level collective action conflicts, activates social capital under the guidance of three theories, and reconstructs resident-centered autonomous governance systems to fundamentally eliminate four-subject game deadlocks.

5.1 Reconstruct Party-Building Integrated Governance Networks to Eliminate Fragmented Games

Taking Party building as the core leadership, Yushan Subdistrict established normalized four-party joint deliberation and red joint conference mechanisms, incorporating subdistrict functional departments, communities, red property, Party members and resident representatives into a unified governance network. Clear power and responsibility lists eliminate responsibility blank areas and buck-passing space. At the community end, a five-level linkage network of subdistrict-community-building-Party member-resident is built by electing red building chiefs and Party central households. Regular joint meetings realize resource sharing and consensus condensation, integrating scattered conflicting stakeholders into a unified co-governance community, and providing stable carrier support for orderly collective action.

5.2 Innovate Reverse Service Mode to Systematically Repair Broken Trust Capital

Yushan Subdistrict abandoned the traditional

"charge first, serve later" operation logic and launched a reverse governance mode of service priority followed by charging. After settlement, red property concentrated on free facility maintenance and elderly convenient services, using tangible governance achievements to reverse residents' negative inherent cognition. A full-process public disclosure mechanism is implemented for service standards, charging basis and financial expenditure to eliminate information asymmetry. Targeted humanistic care for low-income and elderly groups shortens the distance between governance subjects and residents. Long-term transparent high-quality services restore multi-dimensional trust among all parties, laying solid emotional foundation for coordinated collective action.

5.3 Improve Co-Governance Institutional Norms to Build Collective Action Restraint System

Multi-stakeholders jointly formulated localized co-governance systems including deliberation rules, coordination processes and supervision assessment mechanisms. In cross-subject coordination, clear time limits and feedback processes eliminate buck-passing; in resident daily management, public resource rules restrain free-riding through positive incentives and flexible persuasion; in property supervision, a triple assessment system links service quality with operating subsidies. Institutional norms unify multi-subject action logic and transform disordered interest games into standardized collaborative behaviors.

5.4 Empower Resident Autonomy to Build Public Resource Self-Governance System

Breaking the two-party governance mode of government and property, the subdistrict democratically elected resident deliberation and supervision groups, fully granting residents decision-making and evaluation rights in public fund use. An innovative resident point incentive system is launched: positive co-governance behaviors can be exchanged for community convenient services, fundamentally restraining free-riding psychology. For long-term refusal of fees, the subdistrict adopts neighborhood mediation to standardize resident behaviors. Resident autonomy transforms residents from governance opponents to co-governance participants, resolving common-pool resource dilemmas from the source.

5.5 Visible Governance Effects after Institutional Reconstruction

Through the above four systematic mechanisms, Yushan's old communities achieved qualitative governance upgrading. The property fee collection rate rose from 30% to 90%, and 12345 public complaints decreased by more than 70% year-on-year. A stable four-party collaborative operation mechanism was formed, community public facilities operate sustainably, and neighborhood atmosphere continues to improve. The practical data fully verifies that resolving software collective action conflicts is the core key to long-term old community governance.

6. Deep-Seated Deficiencies of Current Red Property Governance

6.1 Superficial Social Capital Cultivation with Unstable Cooperation Foundation

Current trust and network construction mainly rely on special administrative rectification, lacking daily normalized cultivation mechanisms. The trust between residents and property is fragile and easy to decline once service quality fluctuates. Neighborhood interaction platforms are insufficient, residents' collective co-governance awareness has not been fully formed, and the cooperation foundation of all stakeholders is unstable.

6.2 Weak Resident Autonomous Capacity and Insufficient Endogenous Power

Community governance still relies heavily on external administrative driving forces. Many residents retain passive wait-and-see psychology, and the participation willingness of the elderly and young groups is unbalanced. Core governance matters are still dominated by administrative subjects, and a complete closed-loop resident independent supervision system has not been formed, resulting in insufficient spontaneity of collective action.

6.3 Imperfect Closed-Loop Conflict Prevention Mechanisms

Existing rules focus on post-conflict disposal, lacking pre-judgment mechanisms for potential interest games. Some power boundaries are vague, and the restraint force of reward and punishment systems is insufficient. Faced with residents' personalized demands and property operating pressure, new coordination conflicts

may emerge, and the full risk prevention closed loop needs further improvement.

6.4 Imbalance between Public Welfare and Market Operation Weakens Long-Term Resilience

As a public welfare state-owned enterprise, red property's independent income capacity is weak, relying mainly on financial subsidies and property fees. The dual demands of public welfare guarantee and operational balance form inherent contradictions. Once subsidies shrink or payment rates fluctuate, service quality will decline, triggering new trust conflicts and shaking the co-governance order.

7. Long-Term Optimization Paths for Stable Collective Co-Governance

7.1 Normalize Deep Social Capital Cultivation

Transform task-oriented rectification into daily social capital cultivation. Hold regular neighborhood forums and household visits to accumulate long-term neighborhood trust; persist in full public disclosure of governance information. Fix the frequency of four-party joint meetings to turn linkage into daily norms, and popularize co-governance concepts to cultivate residents' public responsibility awareness.

7.2 Deeply Empower Resident Autonomy

Further delegate core governance authority to residents, optimize the point incentive system and expand substantial reward channels. Mobilize Party members and young residents to form autonomous teams to balance participation imbalance, and realize the transformation of collective action from external promotion to spontaneous resident participation.

7.3 Build Full-Chain Conflict Closed-Loop Mechanisms

Further refine four-party power lists and reward-punishment standards. Establish regular conflict risk investigation mechanisms and multi-subject mediation teams. Set up regular governance review links to optimize institutional processes timely and consolidate collaborative order.

7.4 Balance Public Welfare and Market Operation

Activate idle community parking and housing resources to carry out standardized value-added

operations, develop low-cost housekeeping services to expand independent income channels. Implement performance-linked government subsidies to ease property operating pressure, balance public welfare positioning and sustainable operation, and stabilize long-term multi-subject collaborative order.

8. Conclusion

This paper sorts out the complete governance evolution process of old communities in Yushan Subdistrict, and divides governance contradictions into superficial hardware supply-demand conflicts and deep-seated multi-stakeholder software collective action coordination conflicts. The research confirms that aging public facilities are only phased bottlenecks of old community governance, while the fundamental long-term crux is collective action failure caused by three-dimensional scarcity of social capital, which is manifested as interest misalignment, broken trust, missing norms and fragmented networks among subdistricts, communities, red property and residents.

Yushan's red property model breaks the traditional misunderstanding of valuing hardware renovation over institutional construction. Guided by three classic theories, it reconstructs integrated governance networks, innovates reverse service modes, perfects co-governance norms and empowers resident autonomy, thoroughly resolving the nationwide universal dilemma of easy property introduction yet difficult long-term co-governance. The case fully verifies the interpretive power of collective action, social capital and common-pool resource theories in grassroots community governance.

Meanwhile, this research finds that current red property governance still has four deep-seated deficiencies including shallow social capital cultivation and weak resident autonomy, and there are risks of repeated governance conflicts. In the future, old community governance must abandon single hardware thinking, take deep social capital cultivation as the foundation, resident autonomy as the core, conflict closed-loop prevention as the guarantee and balanced operation as support, continuously resolve multi-subject game conflicts and improve the new governance pattern of Party-building leadership, multi-party coordination and sustainable operation. This research provides theoretical reference and replicable practical experience for

the modernization of urban grassroots governance capacity.

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