

The Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee and Gansu's Economic Development during the Total War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression

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Abstract: After the War of Resistance entered its stalemate phase, economic warfare gained growing strategic significance. In June 1940, the National Government established the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee in Lanzhou to coordinate wartime economic affairs across Gansu, Ningxia, Suiyuan and adjacent regions, including fiscal and financial administration, anti-smuggling and block-enforcement, material procurement and stockpiling, and production promotion. To stabilise rear-area finance, the Committee improved financial networks, issued agricultural loans, supported small-scale industries, and purchased and redeemed gold and silver. It built an economic blockade against the enemy by deploying anti-smuggling agencies, convening joint conferences, and imposing strict bans on gold-and-silver smuggling. It secured material supplies by setting up the Yuanyuan Trading House to procure critical commodities, stabilise commodity prices, organising trading corporations, and upgrading land-water transportation infrastructure. Moreover, it advanced Gansu's economic development by boosting grain output, investigating and subsidising industrial enterprises, founding the Zhenxi Textile Mill, expanding cotton cultivation, conducting phosphorus-extraction experiments, and exploring mineral resources. This institution delivered tangible outcomes in sustaining wartime economic operations, curtailing the diversion of materials to the enemy, mitigating commodity shortages, and fostering industrial-mineral growth in Gansu. Nevertheless, its effectiveness was constrained by cumbersome institutional structures, ambiguous division of powers, problematic jurisdiction and personnel arrangements, its short lifespan, and sharp frictions with local authorities and military forces. Its limited performance illustrates the operational

dilemmas embedded within the wartime economic control system as well as central-local state relations under the National Government.

Keywords: Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee; Total War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression; Economic Development of Gansu; Wartime Economic Control; Economic Warfare against the Japanese Enemy.

1. Introduction

The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression represented not only a contest of military strength but also an all-round confrontation of economic capacities. Following the Battle of Wuhan in 1938, the war moved into a strategic stalemate. Having failed to achieve rapid military conquest, Japan shifted to a "war-feeding-on-war" strategy. It set up colonial bodies such as the Asia Development Board, the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Corporation in occupied territories to plunder local resources on a large scale. It further undermined the National Government's financial system by installing puppet regimes, issuing puppet currency and counterfeiting fabi legal tender. Confronted with Japanese economic aggression, the Nanjing-based National Government came to recognise the significance of economic counter-operations and began establishing special economic coordinating bodies within each theatre of war. Against this backdrop, the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee came into being.

The Eighth War-Zone encompassed Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Suiyuan, with its headquarters stationed in Lanzhou, forming a core hinterland for resistance in Northwest China. As coastal eastern territories fell one after another, the Northwest acquired heightened strategic importance, tasked with consolidating

border regions, satisfying domestic consumption demands, and supplying front-line troops. Yet Gansu suffered from a fragile economic foundation, sparse financial institutions, underdeveloped transport networks, and nascent industry and mining. Its proximity to occupied territories aggravated smuggling and the leakage of strategic materials to enemy forces, creating an urgent need for a specialised agency to coordinate regional wartime economic affairs. “On 28 June 1940, the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee was formally inaugurated in Lanzhou. Yang Daoyue, Section Chief of the Currency Department under the Ministry of Finance, was appointed chairperson to oversee wartime economic matters covering finance, anti-smuggling blockades, material procurement-stockpiling and production promotion across Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Suiyuan”[1].

Scholarly research on hinterland economies during the War of Resistance is abundant, yet existing studies mostly focus on overarching national policies or central-level economic organs. Research centred on theatre-level economic institutions at the local level remains relatively limited. Discussions of the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee are scattered across monographs and papers such as Sun Baogen’s *Studies on Anti-Smuggling Efforts of the National Government during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression*[2] and Ren Rong’s “A Review of Economic Resistance Carried out by War-Zone Economic Committees”[3], none of which offer thorough analytical treatment. Drawing primarily on archival fonds of the Executive Yuan’s Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee preserved in the Gansu Provincial Archives, alongside compiled documentary sources including Minutes of the Executive Yuan Economic Conference and National General Mobilisation Conference[4], this paper systematically examines the Committee’s founding context, organisational structure, major economic initiatives, achievements and inherent limitations. It seeks to deepen scholarly understanding of wartime theatre-level economic control regimes and economic development in Gansu province.

2. Institutional Background and Organisational Framework

2.1 Founding Context and Establishment

Process

The creation of the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee constituted part of the National Government’s response to Japanese economic aggression and its effort to refine the wartime economic control system. As early as February 1939, Kong Xiangxi, President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance, tabled the Proposal on Handling Finance and Economy within War Zones at the Third Session of the People’s Political Council. The proposal first advocated establishing economic committees within each war-zone as liaison and implementing agencies, “to formulate and supervise local fiscal, financial and economic undertakings in accordance with central decrees and policies, in collaboration with local governments”[5]. The proposal passed deliberations by the People’s Political Council and the Supreme National Defence Council. However, implementation was deferred because the draft blueprint conferred excessively broad jurisdiction and substantial authority upon these committees, giving them quasi-governmental powers.

In November 1939, Gu Zhutong, Commander-in-Chief of the Third War-Zone, re-proposed the creation of war-zone economic committees at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, and the motion was adopted. In December the same year, the Executive Yuan issued Working Guidelines and Key Organisational Principles for the Third War-Zone Economic Committee[6], and the first wartime war-zone economic committee was set up for the Third War-Zone. In spring 1940, T. V. Soong, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Four-Banks Headquarters, renewed the proposal for universal establishment of such committees during an Executive Yuan meeting, gaining Chiang Kai-shek’s attention. On 5 April, Chiang telegraphed Xu Kan, Secretary-General of the Joint Four-Banks Headquarters: “Set up war-zone economic committees in all theatres without delay”[7]. Ultimately, the 31st Standing Meeting of the Supreme National Defence Council ratified the Organisational Regulations for War-Zone Economic Committees. Between April and November 1940, committees for the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth War-Zones were successively founded. The Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee was formally constituted on 26 June 1940 and

commenced official operations on 28 June.

2.2 Organisational Structure and Mandate

The Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee operated under supervision from relevant central ministries and the Joint Four-Banks Headquarters, as well as guidance from the war-zone commander-in-chief and the director of the War-Area Party-Government Sub-Committee. It comprised one chairperson and two vice-chairpersons, appointed by the Executive Yuan from among committee members. Yang Daoyue, representative of the Ministry of Finance, served as chairperson; Zheng Xiangchen, representative of the Joint Four-Banks Headquarters and manager of the Bank of China's Baotou Branch, and He Qishen, representative of the Eighth War-Zone Headquarters, held vice-chair positions. Additional committee members included Song Liansheng from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Song Xishang, Director of the Northwest Highway Transport Bureau, Xu Yuankun representing the Gansu Provincial Government, Zhao Wenfu, Director of the Ningxia Department of Finance, and Li Juyi, Director of the Suiyuan Department of Finance. Membership assembled stakeholders across finance, economic administration, banking, transportation and provincial governance.

The Committee's internal setup featured a Secretariat, Accounting Office, Special-Counsellor Office, and four operational divisions. Division One handled administrative affairs including documentation, personnel, disbursement, accounting and auditing. Division Two managed financial matters: planning capital for production and material procurement, consolidating financial institutions, and suppressing puppet-currency circulation. Division Three took charge of preventing material diversion to the enemy, enforcing blockades against enemy commodities, adjusting agricultural production, guiding light and small-scale industries, purchasing and transporting materials, and investigating and regulating commodity prices. Division Four coordinated transport operations, optimised human-animal powered conveyance, planned combined land-water transit, and expanded warehouse and wharf infrastructure. Its core responsibilities fell under five headings: tightening blockade and counter-blockade measures, restructuring finance, promoting

production, expanding material acquisition, and rationalising transportation. Originally its jurisdiction covered Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Suiyuan. For contingent political reasons, its effective scope was confined to Gansu, Ningxia and Suiyuan, with a branch office established in Ningxia.

3. Major Economic Operations

3.1 Reorganising Fiscal and Financial Systems

Finance formed the linchpin of wartime economic governance. Before the war, financial institutions remained thinly distributed across the Eighth War-Zone hinterland; bank branches existed only in major urban centres such as Lanzhou, while remote counties possessed almost no formal banking infrastructure. Upon its founding, the Committee prioritised building comprehensive financial networks. Pursuant to the Measures for Administering Banks under Extraordinary Wartime Conditions and Regulations on Bank Registration, it stipulated regulatory thresholds: "money-houses with capital exceeding 30 000 yuan specialising in deposit-taking, lending, remittance and discounting must complete official registration; those with capital below 30 000 yuan should merge and reorganise prior to application for registration; entities purely engaged in commodity trading shall be re-registered as shops or trading firms"[8].

To improve grain supply management and curb hoarding-related malpractice in Gansu, the Committee promoted granary construction. It concluded grain-increase loan contracts with the Gansu Provincial Government, the Central Trust of China, and the Bank of China, Bank of Communications and Farmers Bank of China. "The four banks advanced 8.5 million yuan, supplemented by previously approved cooperative loans totalling 14 million yuan and 3 million yuan from the Provincial Bank of Gansu, yielding a combined fund of 25.5 million yuan earmarked for grain-production loans. The programme aimed to expand cultivated land by 2.3 million mu and raise grain output by 7.5 million shi across 36 counties including Gaolan, Pingliang and Tianshui"[9]. In September 1941, a Small-Industry Loan Office was inaugurated with an initial fund of 600 000 yuan. Eligible factories possessed registered capital between 10 000 and 50 000 yuan, with

individual loan ceilings of 20 000 yuan and a monthly interest rate of eight li. “Loans targeted twelve categories of industries producing military and daily necessities: textiles, tanning, paper-making, ceramics, candle-soap manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, hardware and related sectors”[10]. To encourage gold-silver acquisition and curb fabi outflows, the Committee enlisted the Central Bank of China and its branches to step up precious-metal purchases and supported prospecting at Gansu gold mines. It imposed a 500-yuan ceiling on fabi carried out of provincial boundaries and subjected remittances exceeding that threshold to case-by-case investigation to stem capital flight.

3.2 Tightening Anti-Smuggling and Enemy-Blockade Regimes

Smuggling constituted a principal instrument of Japanese economic aggression. Bordering Mongol banners and occupied eastern Suiyuan, the Eighth War-Zone suffered rampant contraband activity. Wuzhongbao in Ningxia earned the moniker “Shanghai beyond the Great Wall” for its thriving smuggling trade. “Each year, enemy-manufactured goods valued at 15-20 million yuan entered Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai via Baotou; their market value within these provinces could reach 60-70 million yuan”[11]. Four major smuggling routes operated: from Baotou across the Yin Mountains to the Hexi Corridor; from Baotou through Inner Mongolia to Wuzhongbao in Ningxia and onward to Guyuan; from Inner Mongolia to Dingyuaning, then south through northern Shaanxi towards Qingyang or Pingliang; and from Baoji via Huaping into Pingliang.

The Committee deployed multi-pronged anti-smuggling responses. It requested the war-zone headquarters to organise economic guerrilla detachments and “petitioned the Ministry of Finance to establish freight inspection branch offices and agencies in Wuwei, Minqin, Dajing, Xifeng, Dengkou, Wuzhongbao, Bayan, Changtu, Langshan and other locations. It instructed provincial governments to set up joint inspection posts at key transit points and facilitated relocation of the Gansu-Ningxia-Suiyuan Freight Inspection Headquarters from Xi’an to Lanzhou”[12]. In June 1941, it promulgated Measures for Liaison between Inspection Organs and Blockade-Enforcement Agencies, requiring anti-smuggling units to maintain close

intelligence exchange with war-zone headquarters, the Committee itself, inspection corps and political-department organs[13]. To suppress gold-silver trafficking, it addressed abuses whereby gold merchants extended predatory credit to gold-mining labourers, siphoning placer gold for illicit shipment to enemy-held zones. Remedial measures included registration of gold-mining sites by the Central Bank of China, establishing supply cooperatives for miners offering capital and grain, and requesting provincial authorities to reinforce anti-smuggling patrols and protect miners. The Committee also enforced statutory instruments including the Regulations on Prohibiting Materials Destined for the Enemy and Regulations on Suppressing Enemy-Origin Commodities. Persons convicted of trafficking goods to enemy forces faced capital punishment or life imprisonment. When embargoed commodities became unsaleable locally, supplementary Measures for Disposal of Prohibited Enemy-bound Goods authorised state trading agencies to acquire surplus medicinal herbs, animal casings and other goods for redistribution or export-oriented processing, preventing indirect diversion to enemy hands.

3.3 Procuring-Stockpiling Materials and Stabilising Prices

Material resources stood at the heart of wartime economic operations. Eastern Suiyuan under enemy occupation and western Suiyuan-Ordos border districts produced abundant grain, fur and medicinal materials, while Baotou functioned as a major import gateway for north-western commodities, creating fierce competition over material control. In 1940 the Committee formulated the Outline Measures for Emergency Material Procurement[14] and founded the specialised Yuanyuan Trading House to conduct urgent commodity acquisition. Yuanyuan distinguished two operational modes: intra-war-zone procurement including direct purchasing, field procurement teams, and entrusted or joint-venture buying; and behind-enemy-lines procurement by dispatching patriotic merchants on circuitous routes, offering premium purchasing prices, and deploying procurement operatives disguised as local residents. Supplementary Regulations for Registering Patriotic Merchants and Organising Procurement Teams under Yuanyuan Trading House[15] required participating merchants to

possess sound knowledge of commercial conditions around Baotou and Guisui plus reliable surety guarantees.

Starting in September 1940, commodity prices in Lanzhou surged, with certain goods increasing a hundred-fold. Yang Daoyue, Committee chairperson, proposed to the war-zone commander-in-chief the formation of a Price-Stabilisation Research Council comprising six members: the provincial government secretary-general, civil-affairs director, finance director, reconstruction director, the Farmers Bank of China manager, and Yang himself. The Council issued Guidelines for State-subsidised Retail Shops for Daily Necessities in Lanzhou, imposing price controls and per-person purchase quotas on nine essential goods: cloth, cotton yarn, raw cotton, paper, dyestuffs, edible oil, tea, sugar and paraffin candles[16]. Additional Regulations for Merchants Selling Price-controlled Goods concentrated hoarding-traders within six designated price-regulated marketplaces for supervised sales. Open price labelling, public notice boards and confidential informant schemes were instituted; informants received forty percent of proceeds from confiscated speculative stocks upon successful conviction of price-gouging merchants.[^endnote17] The Committee cooperated with Fushenlong-Zhuang under the Ministry of Economic Affairs Agricultural Bureau to set up cotton supply depots in Dingxi, Lintao, Longxi, Linxia, Yuzhong and other counties, selling cotton at ninety percent of prevailing market prices with individual household purchase limits of 30 jin[18].

To remedy poor transport infrastructure and insufficient conveyance capacity, Committee personnel surveyed and mapped six major land arteries, forty-five feeder routes and nine water-transport corridors[19]. It convened joint transport-cooperation conferences among six participating agencies and trialled transport cooperatives on the Lanzhou-Pingliang corridor. It petitioned the Executive Yuan for additional motor vehicles for north-western highway traffic and urged the Salt Administration to procure 4 000 sets of rubber tyres and axles for salt haulage. It liberalised partial access for private commercial trucks on north-western highways and capped detention periods for requisitioned civilian vehicles at twenty-eight hours[20]. For land transport, the Gansu Postal-Transport Administration reorganised provincial routes

into seven administrative segments, registering between 23 000-45 000 camels and thousands of carts, with an estimated annual transport capacity of 69 000-172 500 metric tons. It directed repairs on international arteries including Lanzhou-Xingxingxia, Lanzhou-Tianshui, Lanzhou-Xining routes and inter-provincial links such as Lanzhou-Ningxia, Pingliang-Ningxia and Gansu-Sichuan highways.[21] For inland waterways, the Committee promoted dredging work at the Xixia Gorge on the Yellow River and Jiudian Gorge on the Tao River, commissioned sluice-reservoir construction on the Bailong River, facilitated connection between the Hui-Bai Highway and Jialing River shipping, and created a navigation office at Baishuijiang Town to implement combined land-water transshipment.[22]

3.4 Promoting Production and Resource Exploration

Fostering production constituted one of the Committee's core mandates. The Eighth War-Zone suffered backward agricultural, industrial and mining sectors. Gansu chronically experienced grain deficits; manufacturing was concentrated almost exclusively in Lanzhou with outdated equipment; mineral reserves remained largely untapped. Multiple initiatives were launched to drive local economic development.

On grain production, the Committee drafted the Proposal for Expanding Grain Output and Strengthening Grain Administration, advancing four measures: expanding cultivated acreage, prioritising staple-crop cultivation, supervising harvests and compiling grain-consumption statistics. A provincial Grain-Increase Committee was established under Committee oversight, targeting an additional 2.3 million mu of farmland and a grain output gain of 1.15 million shi[23]. The Committee also advocated handicraft industries, arguing textile, chemical and food-processing handicrafts fitted north-western local conditions well.

To alleviate severe cloth shortages and soaring fabric prices, the Committee founded the Zhenxi Textile Mill in northern Lanzhou's Miaotanzi district. "Occupying 9.6 mu of land, the mill drew 500 000-yuan capital entirely from the Committee's operational fund, installing fifty looms with an annual planned output of 10 000 bolts of cloth"[24]. Construction commenced in September 1941 and production formally began on 10 January 1942. "Upon commissioning, the

mill produced roughly 16-17 bolts of assorted wide cloth daily, recording a surplus of over 1.4 million yuan by the end of 1941"[25]. The Committee collaborated with the Gansu Cooperative Administration to promote women-led hand-weaving in Lanzhou. For cotton-industry expansion, a Cotton-Promotion Committee was jointly created with the Gansu Department of Reconstruction, chaired by Zhang Xinyi, Director of Reconstruction and concurrently Committee member. Promotion offices were planned across twelve counties. By 1941, pilot programmes operated in fourteen counties, bringing 18 515 mu under institutional cotton cultivation, with roughly 60 000 mu of additional privately-planted cotton[26]. The 1942 plan targeted 120 500 mu of new cotton acreage with a 60 000-yuan budget shared equally between the Committee and the Department of Reconstruction; eight counties were designated experimental zones for American cotton varieties[27].

For mineral exploitation and phosphorus-manufacturing experiments, the Committee partnered with the National Resources Commission to develop north-western mineral deposits[28]. Plans were drawn up for five factories (cement, alcohol, iron-smelting, electro-porcelain, power generation) plus three mining sites (coal, manganese, iron). The Yongdeng coalfield possessed particularly rich reserves exceeding those of the well-known Pingxiang coalfield, while manganese deposits lay exposed and easily accessible. Addressing wartime shortages of white and red phosphorus which paralysed match-manufacturing across much of China, the Committee conducted phosphorus-extraction trials using abundant animal bone resources available locally. Repeated experimentation yielded white-phosphorus extraction rates above 0.5 percent from animal bones. White phosphorus was compounded with sulphur to produce phosphorus sulphide; sodium chlorate was successfully synthesised from native mirabilite. The resulting phosphorus sulphide and sodium chlorate were supplied to Lanzhou's Tongsheng Match Company for prototype match production, achieving reliable ignition performance and stability[29].

4. Achievements and Inherent Limitations

4.1 Major Achievements

During its eighteen-month existence, the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee delivered substantial wartime-economic work with tangible results. First, it stabilised fiscal-financial operations within the Eighth War-Zone. By improving financial networks, administering agricultural granary-loan programmes, subsidising small-industry credit, purchasing precious metals and restraining fabi capital flight, it consolidated the north-western rear-area financial system and stimulated rural finance alongside industrial-commercial activity in Gansu. Second, it strengthened anti-smuggling enforcement and economic blockades against enemy forces, lowering risks of strategic-material diversion to Japanese occupation authorities. Through anti-smuggling infrastructure, coordinated intelligence mechanisms and prohibitions on gold-silver trafficking, a relatively comprehensive blockade network took shape across Gansu-Ningxia-Suiyuan. Enforcement of anti-diversion statutes materially reduced commodity flows towards enemy-held territories. Third, it enhanced state capacity for material procurement-stockpiling and eased wartime commodity shortages. Establishment of Yuanyuan Trading House for urgent buying, price-stabilisation interventions, trading-company organisation and upgraded land-water transport secured civilian and military material supplies within the theatre. Price-control policies partially mitigated hyper-inflation in Lanzhou consumer markets. Fourth, it fostered agricultural and industrial-mineral development in Northwest China. The Zhenxi Textile Mill filled a gap in mechanised cotton-textile capacity within Lanzhou. Cotton-promotion campaigns extended cotton cultivation across fourteen Gansu counties. Successful phosphorus-extraction experiments opened practical pathways for utilising regional animal-bone resources. Geological surveys and mineral-resource prospecting laid preliminary groundwork for future industrialisation in the Northwest.

4.2 Deficiencies and Institutional Constraints

Notwithstanding its accomplishments, the Committee's operation suffered from multiple structural flaws. First, cumbersome organisation and blurred authority. As an intermediate-level agency functionally analogous to an

administrative commissioner's office within provincial governance, the Committee faced overlapping competing jurisdictions. Central ministries ran independent procurement and anti-smuggling units outside its purview; production-construction portfolios fell under separate local-agency oversight. Much of its original institutional rationale was thereby undermined. Existing vertical bureaucratic chains maintained no formalised working relationship with the Committee. Simple tasks elicited perfunctory joint responses; difficult matters triggered delay, renegeing and passive obstruction, trapping the Committee in institutional deadlock. Second, ambiguous jurisdiction boundaries and flawed personnel arrangements. War-zone demarcations derived from military imperatives and poorly aligned with economic logic. Provincial administrations clung to parochial interests, obstructing cross-provincial commodity circulation. Although formally organised as a committee-system body, most committee members held nominal status without genuine delegated authority from parent ministries. Scattered geographically and burdened with concurrent posts, they could not deliver effective collective governance. Third, its extremely short lifespan prevented many policy measures from yielding full outcomes. Operating from June 1940 until its dissolution at the end of March 1942, the Committee existed for merely eighteen months. Wartime economic initiatives required lengthy cycles of investigation, planning, policy formulation and implementation before observable effects materialised. The Zhenxi Textile Mill received dissolution notification barely one year after opening; Yuanyuan Trading House faced merger shortly after its founding. Fourth, persistent conflicts with local governments and military bodies severely undermined effectiveness. Military units frequently abetted or directly engaged in smuggling. For instance, the 81st Army deployed over one thousand camels to smuggle fur products; the Committee possessed no recourse beyond requesting the war-zone commander-in-chief to issue reprimands. In one high-profile incident, shortly after the Zhenxi Textile Mill opened, air-force personnel, denied cloth purchases after closing hours, stormed the retail premises with firearms and wounded multiple staff members. Such frictions gravely impaired institutional performance.

5. Conclusion

The Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee represented a specialised wartime agency created by the National Government after the stalemate phase of the War of Resistance to conduct economic warfare and coordinate theatre-level economic affairs in the north-western hinterland. Between June 1940 and March 1942, operating from Lanzhou, it coordinated fiscal-financial administration, anti-smuggling blockades, material procurement-stockpiling and production promotion across Gansu, Ningxia and Suiyuan. It generated positive effects stabilising rear-area finance, constructing economic blockades against the enemy, securing material supplies and advancing north-western economic development.

Nevertheless, wartime systemic constraints imposed notable limitations: bloated administrative structures with blurred powers, defective jurisdiction-personnel arrangements, brief institutional duration, and intractable conflicts with local and military authorities all prevented full realisation of its potential. The Committee's practical experience exposes operational dilemmas within the National Government's wartime economic-control system. Under fragmented central authority and parochial local governance, the capacity of an intermediate war-zone economic agency to implement nationwide policies and bridge central-local divides remained inherently limited. As central-state power consolidated and dedicated specialised economic agencies proliferated, the Eighth War-Zone Economic Committee fulfilled its historical mission and was superseded by Economic Warfare Offices. From a long-term historical perspective, its planning and practical experiments across finance, industry, agriculture, transport and mineral exploration also accumulated practical experience laying groundwork for post-war economic reconstruction in Gansu.

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