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Collective Action Dilemma Resolution and Grassroots Governance Efficiency Improvement: Practical Mechanism of Red Property Management - a Case Study of Yushan Subdistrict, Pingyin, Jinan

Author(s)

Yuan Wenxue

Affiliation(s)

School of Political Science and Law, University of Jinan, Shandong, China *Corresponding Author

Abstract

Old residential communities are typical common-pool resources, which easily produce free-riding behaviors and persistent collective action dilemmas. Existing domestic studies on red property management mostly focus on hardware transformation results and macro model construction, while neglecting the hierarchical distinction between hardware and software governance contradictions, as well as multi-stakeholder interest game logic. Few literatures systematically explain the realistic paradox that "old community hardware renovation is easy, yet long-term stable co-governance is difficult". Taking Yushan Subdistrict of Pingyin County, Jinan as the research case, this paper adopts three classic theories including collective action theory, social capital theory and common-pool resource self-governance theory to sort out the complete governance evolution track of local old residential communities. The research finds that aging public facilities are only superficial governance barriers; the fundamental reason for blocked collective action lies in the triple deficiency of community trust, standardized coordination rules and cross-subject linkage networks. Relying Party-building platforms to revitalize community social capital, the local property fee collection rate increased from 30% to 90%. On the basis of case mechanism analysis, this paper puts forward targeted long-term optimization strategies from two dimensions of deep social capital cultivation and resident autonomous empowerment, which can provide operable practical references for the co-governance construction of old residential communities across the country.

Keywords

Old Residential Communities; Red Property Management; Collective Action Conflicts; Multi-Stakeholder Co-Governance

References

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